Research
Read how they describe their research on their Western University profile.
Latest funding
- $41,400
Potato Auction: A New Market-Clearing Mechanism
SSHRC · 2026 · Principal investigator
- $122,625
Auctions in dynamic settings: theory and empirics
SSHRC · 2015 · Principal investigator
- $60,000
Auction design with financially constrained bidders
SSHRC · 2011 · Principal investigator
No publications available.
Potato Auction: A New Market-Clearing Mechanism
Principal investigators: Zheng, Charles
Auctions in dynamic settings: theory and empirics
Principal investigators: Zheng, Charles Z.
Keywords: auction with resale; empirical auctions; collusion; cartel
Auction design with financially constrained bidders
Principal investigators: Zheng, Charles Z.
Keywords: auctions; auction theory; optimal auction; mechanism design; financially constrained bidders; budget constraints in auctions; coalitions
From CIHR, NSERC and SSHRC funding decisions: CIHR since 2008, NSERC since 1991 and SSHRC since 1998, including their latest published competition results.
A short, specific email works best. This draft uses one of their recent papers; replace the parts in brackets with your own details before sending.
Profile data last refreshed on September 26, 2026 from the university directory, publication records and CIHR, NSERC and SSHRC funding.