This profile is built from public research funding records (CIHR, NSERC and SSHRC). We have not imported them from a Université de Montréal directory, so their publications, courses and email address may be missing. Find their university profile.
Research
Latest funding
- $13,323
Agreeing to Disagree: Incentives and Innovation in Dynamic Settings
SSHRC · 2022 · Principal investigator
- $42,459
Agreeing to Disagree: Incentives and Innovation in Dynamic Settings
SSHRC · 2022 · Principal investigator
- $37,857
Incentive Provision Via Implicit Threats and Punishments: The Role of Private Information in Relational Contracts
SSHRC · 2016 · Principal investigator
Agreeing to Disagree: Incentives and Innovation in Dynamic Settings
Principal investigators: Klein, Nicolas A.
Keywords: microeconomics; economic theory; game theory; dynamic game; strategic information acquisition; divergent priors; overconfidence; principal-agent relationships; relational contracts; innovation; observation delays; free-riding
Agreeing to Disagree: Incentives and Innovation in Dynamic Settings
Principal investigators: Klein, Nicolas A.
Keywords: microeconomics; economic theory; game theory; dynamic game; strategic information acquisition; divergent priors; overconfidence; principal-agent relationships; relational contracts; innovation; observation delays; free-riding
Incentive Provision Via Implicit Threats and Punishments: The Role of Private Information in Relational Contracts
Principal investigators: Klein, Nicolas
Keywords: (1) Microeconomics; (2) Contract Theory; (3) Relational Contracts; (4) Game Theory; (5) Dynamic Games with Imperfect Monitoring; (6) Principal-Agent Relationships
From CIHR, NSERC and SSHRC funding decisions: CIHR since 2008, NSERC since 1991 and SSHRC since 1998, including their latest published competition results.
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